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In Section 4 this paper draws on Richter (2007 and 2008). It replaces these earlier studies by 
presenting their results in consolidated form and by extending them in Sections 3, 5, and 6.   2
 
1. Introduction 
Human-capital accumulation is expected to be the driving engine of economic growth 
and development in the 21
st century. The setting of correct incentives for education 
must therefore rank high on the political agenda. Unfortunately, the economic 
understanding of optimal education policy is still rather limited. A major reason is that 
education is a highly complex process which is affected both by taxation and by 
potential market failures. This paper focuses only on taxation and the effects taxation 
has on the very basic trade-offs in education. Such an objective necessitates ignoring 
various extensions and complications which have been the subject of scrutiny in the 
literature. Thus credibility problems of government policy will be ruled out. The 
possible time inconsistency of education policy is studied by Boadway, Marceau, and 
Marchand (1996) and Andersson and Konrad (2003). The return to education will be 
considered to be certain. Uncertainty is addressed by da Costa and Maestri (2007) and 
Anderberg (2008). Informational asymmetry and availability of nonlinear tax 
instruments will be ruled out. The so-called Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation is 
followed by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), Wigger (2004) and Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2008). Finally, other than Trostel (1993 and 1996), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) 
and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) this paper analyses taxation in a static 
framework. 
The model studied in this paper is the most simple one can think of when analysing the 
basic trade-offs of optimal education policy in taxation. For the most part the focus is 
on a representative taxpayer although implications of taxpayer’s heterogeneity are also 
discussed. The taxpayer has to decide on education, saving, qualified and nonqualified 
labour. The modelling strategy can be justified as follows. Education raises the 
productivity of labour. This makes it necessary to differentiate between qualified and 
nonqualified labour. Education takes time and hence causes a cost in foregone 
nonqualified labour income. One would however not talk of education if foregone 
earnings were the sole cost of education. The term of education suggests that there are 
educators instructing the learners and these educators must be paid. This suggests 
differentiating between (opportunity) costs of learning and (monetary) costs of   3
education.
1 Finally, education has features of investment activity. The costs are only 
born if the return can keep abreast of alternative investments. Hence saving must be 
modelled along with education. 
The model fulfilling such requirements is a straightforward extension of the standard 
two-period lifecycle model and the analysis of optimal taxation stands in Ramsey’s 
tradition. As a first major result it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from 
Ramsey’s Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. No similar 
result (Proposition 2) is known from the Mirrlees approach and it holds for arbitrary 
utility and learning functions. The efficient reduction of nonqualified labour equals the 
one of education and saving in relative terms. With the General Theory of Second-Best 
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956/57) in mind one might think it efficient to spread tax 
distortions uniformly across all feasible margins. There are however particular 
scenarios where such an inference is unwarranted. As others have shown before there 
are well-selected utility functions for which it is second-best not to distort saving 
(Proposition 4) and it is equally second-best not to distort education if the learning 
function is isoelastic (Proposition 3). For the sake of brevity the latter is called the 
Education Efficiency Proposition. First versions have been proved by Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005) and Propositions 3, 5, and 7 are variations designed to clarify the 
assumptions needed to prove the Proposition. It is shown that the assumptions made by 
Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) in their latest version for heterogeneous taxpayers can 
be relaxed in the Ramsey framework (Proposition 7). The most critical assumption 
needed to prove the Proposition is that the elasticity of learning must be constant 
across individuals and varying choices of education. The assumption will be defended 
by referring to the cognitive psychology literature which provides impressive 
empirical evidence in favour of such constancy if only the learning program is kept 
fixed. The evidence is known as the Power Law of Learning. The suggested policy 
implication is to ensure undistorted educational choices within particular learning 
programs (“intensive margin”). Whether and when it is optimal to distort the choice 
between competing learning programs (“extensive margin”) is a question leading 
                                                 
1 The importance of such a differentiation has been stressed before by Trostel, 1993 and 1996. Nielsen and 
Sörensen fail to differentiate and this strongly biases their results. See Section 5 below. Differentiation is   4
beyond the scope of the present study. The final point made by this paper is a political 
one: Tax policy should care more about efficient incentives for education than for 
saving. The argument relies on proving that efficiency in education is a more robust 
result than efficiency in saving when the restrictions on the set of available policy 
instruments are strengthened. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative 
taxpayer. Section 3 demonstrates that it is without any loss of generality if the analysis 
of efficient taxation is carried through for exogenous factor prices. Section 4 is on 
second-best policy and Section 5 on third-best polices. Section 6 looks at the case of 
heterogeneous taxpayers. Section 7 discusses connections to the literature. Section 8 
summarizes. Major proofs are relegated to a technical Appendix.  
 
2. A representative-household model 
Consider a representative household living for two periods. Lifetime utility is given by 
, where   is consumption and   is non-leisure time in period i=1,2. 
Non-leisure time   is identical with second-period labour supply. By contrast, only 
 is time spent in the market while time E is spent on education. First-period 
labour supply earns a constant wage rate 
1212 (,,,) UCC LL
1 LE −
i C i L
2 L
1 ω ; the productivity of second-period labour 
depends on the amount of education. It is paid  2 () HE ω , where  2 ω  is the endogenously 
determined wage rate and where the learning function  H(E) displays positive but 
diminishing returns, H′>0>H′′. It is suggestive to interpret   and  as qualified 
labour  and  effective qualified labour, respectively. Equally we will refer to 
nonqualified labour and  nonqualified non-leisure in the case of   and  , 
respectively. Education has an opportunity cost in forgone earnings captured by 
2 L 2 HL
1 L − E 1 L
1 ω E. 
This cost of learning adds to the (monetary) cost of education for which college fees 
may stand. For the sake of simplicity the monetary cost is equally modelled as a linear 
function of the amount of education,  E ϕ . The share of first-period income that is 
neither spent on education nor on consumption is saved, 
                                                                                                                                                         
however not crucial in the Mirrlees approach to the optimal taxation of education. See Jacobs and Bovenberg   5
  11 1 1 1 1 1 () () SL E E C L E C ω ϕω ω ϕ =− − − = − + − .    (1) 
By way of normalization, the price of consumption is set equal to one. The gross rate 
of return to saving is denoted by ρ . Second-period consumption is constrained by 
income earned, 
  22 () CSH E 2 L ρ ω =+   .        (2) 
All prices are after taxes and subsidies, and the question is which combination of taxes 
and subsidies is constrained efficient. The representative household is assumed to 
maximize utility in   subject to the lifetime budget constraint  1212 ,, ,, CCLLE
  12 1 12 2 () CC L H E L E ρ ρω ω π += + −      (3) 
stated in second-period units. Interpret  ) ( 1 ϕ ω ρ π + ≡  as the effective (unit) cost of 
education.  
The analysis relies on the dual approach to optimal taxation. This means that the focus 
is shifted from the household’s (indirect) utility function to its (net) expenditure 
function. The task of minimizing (net) expenditures subject to an exogenous utility 
constraint is best solved in a two-step approach. At the first step, income derived from 
education is maximized while keeping the level of   fixed. Let this income be 
denoted by 
2 L
) , , ( 2 2 L Y π ω   ] ) ( [ max 2 2 E L E H
E π ω − ≡ , and the optimal amount of education 
by  ) , 2 L , ( 2 E π ω . The optimal amount is implicitly defined by the first-order condition, 
22 ' HL ω π = . If the second-period labour supply   were exogenous, Y would stand 
for pure rent income. However, the focus is here on an endogenous choice of  . 
Hence Y has to be interpreted as quasi-rent income, the source of which is learning and 






























ωω =−  > 0. 
Let the second-period wage rate before taxes be denoted by  , and the effective 
social cost of education (i.e., the effective cost before taxes and subsidies) by 
2 w
                                                                                                                                                         
(2008).   6
1 ( pr w f =+ ) .  r  is the gross rate of return to saving before taxes and subsidies. 
Equally f is the (unit) cost of education before taxes and subsidies. The choice of 
education is efficient if the tax wedge δ  between the marginal social return and the 
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vanishes. The tax wedge vanishes if, and only if, the rates of return before and after 





=   .             ( 4 )  
The taxpayer’s expenditure function is defined as 
  12 (,,, ; ) eu ω ωρ ϕ ≡   12 1 1 2 1 2 min[ ( , ( ), )] CC LY L ρ ρω ω ρ ω ϕ + −− +  
in     such that   .  1212 ,, , CCLL 1212 (,,,) UCC LL u ≥
By relying on a straightforward generalization of the textbook version of Hotelling’s 

















, eϕ  =  E ρ , 
and eρ  =  11 1 1 () CL E ω ωϕ −+ + =  S −  where subscripts of e indicate partial derivatives. 
The capital letters  , S and   have to be interpreted as Hicksian supply and demand 
functions. This means that they have to be evaluated at 
i L 1 C
12 ,, , ω ωρ ϕ
2 1 2 ) ,(,, L
, and u. As a result, 
the choice of education reads  21 (, ( , ; ) ) EE u ω ρω ϕ ρϕ ωω = +  when the 
functional relationships are fully spelled out. 
The government faces the need to raise revenue. Four linear tax instruments are 
available, each of which is distorting. The taxes are levied on period i’s labour income, 
on capital income and on the cost of education. For the most part of the analysis we 
choose to model the tax instruments implicitly as the difference between prices before 
and after tax. This means that the tax on period i’s labour income is modelled by 
i w i ω − , the tax on capital income by r ρ −  and the tax on the cost of education by 
f ϕ − . Additionally, we allow for public debt, B.  A priori each tax may well be   7
negative and hence an effective subsidy. To find out which combination of taxes and 
subsidies is constrained efficient is the subject of the analysis. Government revenue is 
given by 
  11 1 1 () ( ) ( ) Tw L E f E B ω ϕ ≡− − + − +  
in the first period and by 
  22 2 2 () ( ) ( ) Tw H E Lr S r B ω ρ ≡− + −−  
in second period. 
 
3. The case of endogenous factor prices 
A driving assumption of the analysis is that the individual return to learning is 
decreasing while the return to saving is constant. Such a differentiation is justifiable on 
the level of individual behaviour. It is clearly no valid description of aggregate 
behaviour. In a closed economy with fixed labour supply the returns to saving cannot 
be constant. As a result one might conjecture that any reason for taxing saving and 
education differently vanishes when factor prices are endogenous.
2 This section is to 
show that such a conjecture is not correct. All the results derived below continue to 
hold if second-period’s factor prices r and   are endogenous. In order to prove this 
claim the model is enriched by endogenous production F in period two. Production is 
linear homogeneous in capital, K, and effective labour,  . Hence education is 
labour augmenting. By referring to capital market clearing, capital is substituted by 




The tax planner is assumed to maximize the first period’s tax revenue   in    1 T
122 , , , ,,, wr B ω ωρ ϕ
) −
                                                
  subject to the constraints 
    =   c o n s t a n t   ,          ( 5 )   2 T
 0  =  e,            ( 6 )  
    a n d           ( 7 )   2 (, K rF H L SB =
 
2 In fact, a referee argued this way.    8
22 (, L wF H L S B = ) − .         ( 8 )  
(7) and (8) follow from profit maximization. (6) is the representative taxpayer’s budget 
constraint. Let all the conditions of regularity hold that are needed to make the 
optimization a well-behaved problem and to sustain interior solutions, 
>0. Note that just assuming a quasi-concave utility function would 
not guarantee interior solutions. Instead, the disutility of qualified labour must be 
sufficiently convex in order to outweigh the convexity of Y when expressed as a 
function of  . See the example below in Section 4. By invoking Hotelling’s lemma 
the planner’s optimization can be written as 
121 2 ,, ,, − CCL ELE
2 L
  11 1 1
11
max [ ( ) ( ) ] TB w e f e ϕ ωϕ
ρρ
=− − − −  
in   122 ,,, , , , wr B ω ωρ ϕ
]
 subject to the constraints 
22 2 2 [( ) () Tr B w e r e ρ ω ρ =− + − + −  = constant      (μ) (5’) 
0 = e          ( λ ) (6’) 
         ( 2 (, K rF ee B ρ =− − − ) α ) (7’) 
22 (, L wFeeB ρ =− − − )        ( β ) (8’) 












:  1 KK LK rFF μ αβ −= − − = 2 [] KK LK KF HL F μ +  = 0 
where the last equality holds because of constant returns to scale. As a result,  1/r μ = . 








λ −  =  2 [] KL LL x F Fe α β −+ [] KK LK x F Fe ρ α β − +    9
      =   22 [] KL LL x KF HL F e μ + 2 [] KK LK x KF HL F eρ μ + +  = 0    (9) 
where the last equality once more holds because of linear homogeneity in production. 
As a result one may safely ignore the production side when determining the second-
best efficient tax structure. It makes no real difference whether the tax structure is 
determined for the closed or the small open economy. 
 
Proposition 1: If returns to scale are constant, the efficient tax structure is independent 
of the production side. The efficient tax structure in the closed economy is 
the same as in the small open economy. 
 
One can argue that Proposition 1 is just an application of the Production Efficiency 
Theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Still, a priori it is not clear whether the 
Production Efficiency Theorem applies in the present context where the taxpayer earns 
quasi-pure ability rent income, Y>0. Notice that Proposition 1 is obtained without 
requiring Y to be skimmed off by taxation. 
 
4. Second-best efficient policy 
In its reduced form, the tax planner’s problem is to maximize revenue 
T = 11 1
11
[( ) ( )] we fe ϕ ωϕ
ρρ
−+−+ 22 2 [( ) ( ) ]/ we r e r ρ ω ρ − +−  (10) 
in   12 ,,, x ϕ ωωρ =   subject to the individual budget constraint (6’). In the Appendix it 
is shown: Taking partial derivatives with respect to  12 ,,, x ϕ ωωρ = , invoking 
Hotelling’s lemma, and eliminating the Lagrange multiplier yields the following 
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where the total differentiation operator Δ is defined on arbitrary functions 
12 (, ,, ; ) XX u ω ωρ ϕ =  by   10
11
1
() Xw 1 Δω
ρ
≡− X  + 
1
() f Xϕ ϕ
ρ











According to (12) ΔX equals the weighted sum of the partial derivatives of X with the 
weights given by the tax wedges. It is an approximation of the total change in X when 
taxes are efficiently chosen. By relying on some simple algebraic manipulations and 
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L2
Δ
= (1-η ) 1 L
L1
Δ
.     (11′) 
As differentiation is additive, (11’) could equally and equivalently be written in the 
form where the ratio   is replaced with the ratio  1 / ΔLL 1 ) 11 () / ( Δ − − LELE . In the 












Hence quantities  , , ,E, 1 C 2 C 1 L 1 LE −  and   should be reduced in the same 
proportion relative to the pre-tax position whereas   should be reduced to a lesser 
degree when all these demand and supply functions are interpreted in the Hicksian 
sense. The equiproportionate reduction is something one would clearly expect in view 
of Ramsey’s (1927) characterization of efficient taxation. The striking result concerns 
. Obviously, efficiency requires reducing qualified labour relatively less than non-




η and it decreases in η. In other words, the more 
elastic the individual learning function is, the less should qualified labour be reduced 
in relative terms. Although this makes good sense one must see that it fails to agree 
with Ramsey’s Rule of reducing all household choices equiproportionately. Only 
effective labour   is reduced equiproportionately. As H=H(E) reacts elastically,   
is reduced less. 
2 HL 2 L
   11
Proposition 2: Second-best efficient policy requires reducing  
(i) education, consumption, nonqualified non-leisure/labour and effective
  qualified labour equiproportionately while reducing   














  .        (14) 
 
Proposition 2 raises the question as to which choices of  12 ,, ϕ ωω and ρ  (and the 
associated tax rates) are second-best. Clearly, one should not expect any interesting 
relationship to hold in full generality. Still, a remarkably strong result is obtained if the 
individual learning function is isoelastic,   with 0<
η hE E H = ) ( 1 < η . In this special 
case, the relative reductions   and  2 / LL Δ 2 / EE Δ  take on a linear relationship for 
arbitrary choices of  12 ,, ϕ ωω,ρ , 1 () π ρω ϕ = +  and  1 () w f pr = + . This is easily seen 
when applying the operator Δ to the first-order condition determining the optimal 
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−  .         ( 1 5 )  
Notice that (15) holds for constant η  but not necessarily efficient choices of  12 ,, ϕ ωω 
and  ρ  while (11’) holds for efficient choices of  12 ,, ϕ ωω and ρ  but not necessarily 
constant η . Comparing (15) with (11’) implies (4). 
 
Proposition 3: If the individual learning function is isoelastic, it is efficient not to 
distort the choice of education. 
   12
Proposition 3 is the first version of the Education Efficiency Proposition derived in 
this paper. An intuitive explanation is the following. The planner’s problem is to set 
incentives so that two objectives are achieved simultaneously. One objective is to 
minimize the efficiency loss resulting from distorted choices of utility generating 
quantities  , ,  and  . The other objective is to minimize losses of quasi-pure 
ability rent income. In general, these two minimizations are not separable so that the 
planner has to trade off. Separability is only ensured if (4) holds. If (4) is violated, 
maximizing the private ability rent in E at given   does not necessarily maximize the 
social ability rent. This is revealed by the following identity:  
1 C 2 C 1 L 2 L
2 L





HL E ω π
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Vice versa, if (4) holds, the last bracketed term on the right-hand side vanishes. This 
implies that the social ability rent is maximized whenever the private ability rent is 
maximized by the price-taking taxpayer. Furthermore, because of (15) this 
maximization need not be traded off against distortions in the choice of  . The 
relative reductions of E and   are efficient for arbitrary choices of 
2 L
2 2 L 1 ,, ϕ ωω and ρ  
whenever (4) holds. However note that the derivation of (15) requires η  being 
constant so that separability is only obtained for an isoelastic learning function.  
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 implies that efficient policy well tolerates a reduction 
in education. This reduction cannot be interpreted, however, as a (conditional) 
distortion of education. This observation allows one to qualify Trostel (1993) who 
stresses the negative effect of proportional income and consumption taxation on 
education. To make the point clear, consider some proportional tax on labour income 
and allow costs of education to be tax deductible. In this case   is reduced in the 
same proportion as p. As a result all individual choices of  , ,  and   will be 
distorted. Still, the partial efficiency condition (4) holds by construction. 
2 w
2 C L 1 C 1 2 L
Consider the question of when it is efficient not to distort saving. From Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1974) it is known that it is largely a matter of preferences 
whether savings should be taxed or not in a Ramsey model of finite periods. This 
result extends to the present framework:   13
 
Proposition 4: If  =  with some homothetic function 
G, it is efficient not to distort saving and to set 
1212 (,,,) UCC LL 12 12 ((, ) ,, ) UGCC LL
r ρ = . 
 
The proof is straightforward. Linear homogeneity of G ensures that the ratio of optimal 
individual consumption does only depend on ρ  and on no other policy instrument: 
































,    (16) 
one obtains  r ρ = . 
To illustrate the effect of endogenous education on efficient labour taxation consider 
the example given by 
HE
η = ,  , 
'
12 1 1 22 (, ) () () UG C C V L V L =− −
" / ii i LV V i ν ≡  (i=1,2), (17) 
and homothetic G. The taxpayer’s optimization is only well-behaved if the concavity 
of  U as a function of   is strong enough to compensate for the convexity of  2 L
) , , ( 2 2 L Y π ω     ≡ 2 ( HE 2 max[ ) ]
E
L E ω π −  in  . This means that  2 L 2 ν > /(1 ) η η −  has to 
hold by assumption. Define taxes  i τ  in “exclusive form” by setting  2 (1 ) 2 2 w τ ω ≡+  and 
1 (1 ) w 1 1 τ ω ≡+ . In the Appendix it is shown that wage taxes are second best if they 




(1 ) τ ην η
τν
−−
= .          ( 1 8 )  
As  2 ν > /(1 ) η η −  is to hold by assumption, the numerator on the right-hand side of (18) 
is positive. For  0 η =
i
, (18) is the familiar Inverse Elasticity Rule. According to this 
rule wage taxes τ  should be set inversely proportional to the wage elasticities of 
labour supplies 1/ i ν . This rule is extended by (18) to cope for endogenous education. 
The effect of education is to reduce  2 τ  relative to  1 τ . Just note that  2 (1 ) η νη −− < 2 ν . 
   14
5. Third-best efficient policies 
In this section it is argued that the setting of efficient incentives for education is an 
objective policy should pursue with higher priority than the setting of efficient 
incentives for saving. The argument relies on assuming that the set of potential policy 
instruments  12 {, , ,} ϕ ωω ρ
12 (, UCC
 is incomplete and on identifying those first-best efficiency 
conditions which survive under such conditions. It is shown that there are subsets of 
available instruments for which it is efficient not to distort education even though 
saving is distorted. This contrasts with all other examined scenarios for which it is 
efficient to distort saving jointly with education. In particular, no scenario can be 
identified for which it is efficient not to distort saving but to distort education. In order 
to ensure an unbiased comparison of education and saving policies, the assumptions 
 and  =  shall hold throughout. Hence it 
is second best by assumption neither to distort saving nor to distort education 
(Propositions 3 and 4). The obvious advantage of making both assumptions and not 
just one is that it saves one to argue which of the two is empirically more supported. 
η hE E H = ) ( 12 ,,) LL 12 12 ((, ) ,, ) UGCC LL
 
Proposition 5: Whenever ϕ  and  2 ω  are available policy instruments, it is efficient not 
to distort education even if saving should be distorted for some exogenous 
reason. 
 
The proof is implicit in the proof of Proposition 3. Just note that the proof of 
Proposition 3 makes no use of the first-order conditions associated with  1 ω  and ρ . 
The proof of the following proposition is more involved and therefore relegated to the 
Appendix. 
 
Proposition 6: Whenever either ϕ  or  2 ω  is the only non-available policy instrument, it 
is efficient to distort saving if, and only if, it is efficient to distort education. 
   15
An intuitive interpretation for Propositions 5 and 6 is as follows. In the discussion of 
Proposition 3 it has been argued that the planner has to pursue two objectives 
simultaneously. One objective is to minimize the efficiency loss resulting from 
distorted choices of utility generating quantities, while the other objective is to 
maximize the ability rent. If the learning function is isoelastic and if the set of policy 
instruments is sufficiently rich, these optimizations are separable. The present section 
identifies those policy instruments which must be available. The planner must be able 
to rely on ϕ  and  2 ω . While  2 ω  allows the planner to target distortions in the choices 
of utility generating quantities, ϕ  allows her to target the ability rent. If one of the two 
instruments is lacking, the planner has to trade off the two objectives.  
The present analysis is related to studies by Nielsen and Sörensen (1997) and Jacobs 
and Bovenberg (2007). These authors analyse the merits of dual income taxation. The 
main result of Nielsen and Sörensen (1997, p. 325) states that labour income should 
optimally be taxed progressively,  22 /w ω < 1 /w1 ω , if qualified labour supply is not too 
elastic and cross substitution of complementarity effects are not too strong. An 
important qualification of this result is that Nielsen and Sörensen do not model costs of 
education. Furthermore, they assume that saving is taxed for some exogenous reason. 
Hence it is as if the two instruments ρ  and ϕ  are politically not available. In terms of 
the present section this means that the progressivity result has at most third-best if not 
forth-best status. Within the Ramsey framework the instrument ϕ  cannot be 
substituted by  1 ω  without affecting efficiency. Subsidizing the cost of foregone 
earnings is instrumentally not equivalent to subsidizing the monetary cost of 
education. 
 
6. The case of heterogeneous taxpayers 
In a series of papers Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007 
and 2008) work out the conditions under which it is optimal (not) to distort education 
when following the approach of Mirrlees (1971) characterized by asymmetric 
information. The results derived depend on the availability of nonlinear or only linear 
policy instruments. Some of the results derived for linear instruments come close to   16
present ones while others do not. The deviations are caused by various differences in 
the way the planner problem is set up. In some respects, the model of Jacobs and 
Bovenberg is less general than the present one. E.g. qualified and nonqualified labour 
supplies are not differentiated and the planner is assumed to have a poll tax at her 
disposal. Under such assumptions no result like Proposition 2 can be derived. In other 
respects, the model of Jacobs and Bovenberg is even more general. It is one of 
heterogeneous taxpayers and differentiated degrees of verifiable learning. Inter alia 
they prove that education should be distorted jointly with saving if education is not 
verifiable (Jacobs et al., 2007). This strongly reminds one of the part of Proposition 6 
referring to the lacking availability of ϕ . Furthermore, they demonstrate that even a 
planner trading off efficiency against equity will not compromise on efficiency in 
education if only education is fully verifiable, the learning function weakly separable 
and isoelastic (Jacobs at al., 2008). Proposition 7 below confirms and extends this 
result. The extension lies in showing that two assumptions on which the analysis of 
Jacobs and Bovenberg is based can be abandoned. One is the availability of a poll tax 
and the other is the assumption of identical utility functions. 
Let   be the parameter identifying a particular taxpayer. Taxpayers are 
assumed to differ by preferences and the productivity of learning but not by the 
elasticity of learning. Hence   and 
1,.., n = N
1212 (,,,)
n
n uU C C L L =
n
n Hh E
η = . Let  ,   etc. 
be the choices made by n and let   denote the taxes paid by n on labour income, 
savings and the cost of education as specified by (10). In order to model redistribution 
assume that n receives some exogenous income   financed out of general tax 
revenues. The planner then maximizes net aggregate tax revenue subject to the 
constraints that individual budgets are balanced and that welfare W remains constant: 
n E 2n L
n T
n g




Tg − ∑ 2 ,, n u ϕ ω   subject to  n g = 12 (,,, ;) n eu ω ωρ ϕ    ( n λ ) 
 and   = constant.  1 (, . . , ) N Wu u
   17
Proposition 7: Assuming heterogeneous taxpayers but constancy of the learning 
elasticity η  in   and assuming availability of  , nE 2 , ϕ ω , it is optimal not to 
distort education. 
 
The proof is a straightforward extension of the one of Proposition 5. See Appendix. 
 
7. Nonlinear instruments and the Power Law of Learning 
There have been attempts by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and by Wigger (2004) to 
characterize optimal incentives for education when adopting the modelling tradition of 
Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The specific feature of this approach 
is the assumption of asymmetric information. In terms of the present notation it is as if 
the qualified wage rate   and the qualified labour supply   are private and no 
public information. The planner can only verify the product of the two. In a model 
with education the question arises whether and to what extent the amount of education 
should be verifiable. Bovenberg and Jacobs study the scenario when   is verifiable as 
well as the scenario when   is imperfectly verifiable. The following discussion 
assumes that all individual choices,  , except the one of qualified labour 
supply, are verifiable. Full verifiability of   convinces to the extent that education 
can be measured by the years spent in institutions of education. Jacobs and Bovenberg 
(2008) demonstrate that it is optimal not to distort education if three assumptions hold: 
(i) The planner must be able to levy a nonlinear tax T on qualified labour income and 
also to subsidize costs of education by some nonlinear scheme S. (ii) Utility functions 
must be weakly separable in qualified labour and all other individual choice variables. 






121 ,, , nn n CCLE
n E
121 (( , , ) UU V C C L
n
2 , ) L = . (iii) Qualified labour income 
before tax, 2 Z , must be weakly separable in n and  , on the one hand, and in 
education E, on the other hand, so that 
2 L
2 Z  can be written as  2 Z ( ,E). Given 
this set of assumptions, it is optimal to equalize marginal rates of taxation and 
subsidization, T’=S’. As a result is not only education undistorted but also saving and 
nonqualified labour supply. The most direct way of implementing such an optimal tax-
2 (, wn 2 ) L  18
transfer system would be the following. (i) Only qualified labour income is taxed. (ii) 
Taxpayers are allowed to carry forward costs of learning and education and to deduct 
them against qualified labour income  2 Z . Notice that not only foregone earnings 
should be tax deductible but also all monetary costs of education. See also Trostel 
(1996 and 1993) who argues in favour of deductions even exceeding one hundred 
percent. 
Da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2008) extend the analysis of optimal 
education policy by incorporating uncertainty. Anderberg sets up a model in which 
qualified labour income can be written in multiplicative form,  2 Z = , and in 
which n takes the role of a productivity shock hitting the representative taxpayer. He 
demonstrates that education should not be distorted if the elasticity of 
22 (, ) wn EL
2
2
Z  with respect 
to  E is constant in n. The simplest specification ensuring such constancy is 
multiplicative,  2 Z = . Jacobs and Bovenberg (2008) find such a 
specification restrictive and presumably too restrictive to serve as the basis of policy 
recommendations. However, I find this view too pessimistic given the empirical 
evidence provided by cognitive psychology. The relevant keyword is the Power Law 
of Learning. The content of this law is the following. According to common 
experience, most tasks get faster with practice, and this holds across task size and task 
type. If the relationship between practice and the completion time of a task is plotted, a 
power law is generally seen to provide the best fit. The elasticity of completion is not 
only a constant function of practice; it also seems to be fairly constant across 
individuals. In any case, individual learning functions seem to differ less by their 
elasticities than by their level (Anderson, 2005 (1980), Chap. 6; Crossman, 1959). If 
practice is denoted by E and the inverse of the completion time by H, this evidence 
suggests specifying   as 
2 () () wn H E L
22 (, ) wn E
2
2 2 () H () n wn E w h E
η = . The only drawback is that 
elasticities may differ strongly between different learning programs. This suggests 
relying on the Power Law of Learning if the focus is on a particular learning program 
and rejecting it else. The policy implication would be to ensure that educational 
choices are at least not distorted within particular learning programs (“intensive 
margin”). Whether and when it is optimal to distort the choice between competing 
learning programs (“extensive margin”) cannot be answered by the present study.   19
According to Ritter et al. (2001) “the power law of practice is ubiquitous”. Still, little 
references can be found in the economics literature. A well-known exemption is 
Arrow (1962). However, in Arrow’s model the learning function takes the role of a 
labour demand curve. Knowledge is completely embodied in capital, and at each 
moment of time capital goods of different vintages are in use. As Arrow stresses 
himself in his closing comments, the implicit assumption is that learning takes place 
only as a by-product of ordinary production. By way of contrast, learning is central in 
the present model. It is an individual investment in one’s own productivity and the 
result of endogenous choice. 
 
8. Summary 
Economists are only beginning to understand the optimal setting of tax incentives for 
education. A major breakthrough is by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). The present 
paper contributes to the literature by analysing efficient taxation of education in 
Ramsey’s tradition. It does so by relying on the standard two-period life-cycle model 
of a representative household with endogenous consumption, labour, and education. A 
first notable result states that Ramsey’s Rule does not apply to qualified labour. 
Qualified labour supply should be reduced less than nonqualified labour. Only the 
latter should be reduced in the same proportion as consumption and saving as 
suggested by Ramsey’s Rule (Proposition 2). No particularly selected utility functions 
are needed to derive the result. The modelling strategy however seems to be critical. 
At least no similar result has been derived before within the Mirrlees framework of 
asymmetric information. 
The drawback of the Ramsey approach is that efficient reductions of demands and 
supplies cannot be translated one to one into efficient tax rates. Statements about 
efficient tax rates are only possible if specific assumptions are made. The familiar 
Inverse Elasticity Rule is an example which only holds for well selected utility 
functions. In Section 4 it is shown how this rule has to be adapted if applied to 
qualified and nonqualified labour. Furthermore, scenarios are considered for which it 
is efficient not to distort education or saving. In accordance with Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1972) and others it is shown to be a matter of taxpayer’s preferences whether saving   20
should be taxed or not (Proposition 4). The Education Efficiency Proposition 
according to which it is second-best not to distort education is shown to hold if the 
learning function is isoelastic (Proposition 3). Section 5 analyses third-best policies 
and provides evidence for the thesis that efficient policy cares more about education 
than saving. The analysis is third-best in the sense that the set of policy instruments 
sustaining second-best solutions is incomplete. It is shown that there are scenarios for 
which it is efficient not to distort education even though saving is distorted. This 
contrasts with all other examined scenarios for which it is efficient to distort saving 
jointly with education. In particular, no scenario can be identified for which it is 
efficient not to distort saving but to distort education. In Section 6 it is finally shown to 
be efficient not to distort education even if taxpayers are heterogeneous (Proposition 
7). This version of the Education Efficiency Proposition generalizes earlier ones by 
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007 and 2008). Two sets of 
assumptions must hold to prove the present version: (i) It must be possible to tax 
qualified labour and to tax/subsidize the (monetary) cost of education. (ii) The learning 
function must be isoelastic and the elasticity must be constant across individuals. 
(These assumptions do not have to hold in full strength if the Education Efficiency 
Proposition is proved in the Mirrlees framework. See Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008, 
and Anderberg, 2008.) 
The theoretical analysis raises the question of whether and to what extent the 
Education Efficiency Proposition can serve as a guide for education policy. Jacobs and 
Bovenberg (2008) express scepticism. They find the assumptions needed to prove 
efficiency in education “restrictive”. In Section 7 a more positive view is proposed. It 
is argued that cognitive psychology provides impressive evidence for learning 
functions the elasticity of which does vary neither in the amount of learning nor 
between individuals. Applicability of this Power Law of Learning is only limited by 
the observation that the elasticities can differ strongly between different learning 
programs. The suggested policy conclusion is that educational choices should at least 
not be distorted at the intensive margin. Things may be different at the extensive 
margin. Whether and when it is optimal to intervene with individual choices between   21
competing learning programs cannot however be answered by present study and must 
be the subject of future research. 
 
9. Appendix 
The proof of (11) relies on taking partial derivatives of the Lagrange function Te λ −  
with respect to  1 ,, ϕ ρω, and  2 ω : 
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By Hotelling’s lemma and by the definition of the Δ-operator, one obtains 
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Plugging (20) into (19) yields  1/ / rE E λ Δ −= . Similarly one derives  
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By relying on the definition of the expenditure function and by invoking Hotelling’s 
lemma one obtains 
  12 x x CC ρ +     = 11 2 2 x x LH L ρωω +      for   12 ,, , x ω ωρ ϕ = .  (21) 
The relationship (21) extends to the Δ-notation: 
  12 CC ρΔΔ +  =  11 2 2 LH L ρωΔ ω Δ +   .       ( 2 2 )  
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Proof  of  (18): As   is linear homogeneous, it is efficient to set  12 (, ) GC C r ρ = . 
Optimizing utility in consumption yields  = =  and 
=  . Set 
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The determination of   is a bit more involved. The first-order condition of the 
taxpayer’s optimal choice of   is 
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After solving for   and equating  2 / LL Δ 2 2 2 / LL Δ  with  1 (1 ) / LL 1 η Δ −  one ends up with 
(18).□ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume that  2 ω  is the only non-available policy instrument. 
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ωη − - 2 HL2 ω δ  
      =  - 2 HL2 ω δ .          ( 2 4 )  
The latter equality relies on the budget constraint, e=0, and the fact that for an 
isoelastic learning function and an optimal choice of E the equality  22 (1 ) HL ω η −  = 
22 HL E ω π −
r
 has to hold. When comparing the extreme hand sides of (24) one ends up 





If  ϕ  is the only non-available policy instrument, one has to study the system of 













































= η δ −+ . Plugging the 


























ω ηδ − +  





ωη −  
+  
2




CC E E LE H L
C
δρ ρ ϕ ϕ ρ ω ω ++ + − −− ) ]    24





δ ϕ . 




>  □ 
 
The Proof of Proposition 7 generalizes the one given above in proving (11). The first-
order condition of the planner’s maximization with respect to ϕ  is obtained along the 
lines indicated by (19) and (20): 
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The derivation with respect to  2 ω  yields: 
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